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Mourners in the Court: Victims in Death
Penalty Trials, through the Lens of
Performance
Sarah Beth Kaufman
This article presents findings from ethnographic research in death penalty trials around
the United States, focusing on the role of victims and their supporters. Victim impact
testimony (VIT) in death penalty sentencing has received intense legal scrutiny during the
past thirty years. The ruling jurisprudence allows VIT with the explanation that it deserves
parity with testimony about the defendant’s background. Drawing on observations and
interviews with participants in 15 death penalty trials, I demonstrate that this framing
confuses the central role of victim supporters in the courtroom. Victim supporters function
as mourners, which grants them a socially elevated position in the courtroom. I argue that
the consequences of the institutionalization of VIT can only be understood through this
lens.
“One weeps not only because he is sad, but because he is forced to weep.”
– Emile Durkheim ([1915] 1965)
Prosecuting attorney to heavy, middle-aged man on the witness stand: I’m
going to ask you a few questions now, okay?
Witness: Mm hmm.
Prosecutor: Did you write a poem to read at your daughter’s funeral?
Witness: Mm hmm.
Prosecutor: Were you too upset to read that poem at the funeral?
Witness: Mm hmm.
Prosecutor: Do you think you can read that poem for us today?
Witness: Mm hmm.
Prosecutor: Go ahead.
Witness: My darling daughter (witness stifles a sob and stops to compose
himself). . .
– Death penalty trial, Fall 2007
The man mentioned above looks unaccustomed to showing emotion under the
best of circumstances. Clutching the paper that he is trying to read, he looks down
at his hands and smoothes the tie that does not quite cover his belly rounding over
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his belt. The attorney who elicits his testimony is patient, and after several false
starts the man reads through the poem, memorializing his daughter for a room filled
with family and strangers. As he stumbles down off the witness stand and returns to
his seat behind the prosecutors’ table, many of the audience members and jurors are
crying.
This article examines the role of victims in death penalty sentencing. “Victim
impact testimony” or (VIT), as exemplified above, has become routine in death
penalty trials since 1991, when the United States Supreme Court handed down a
controversial opinion allowing family members of the deceased to participate in the
sentencing phase of the trial. According to the Court, VIT’s inclusion is intended
to give the jury a “quick glimpse” of the victim’s life and the harm co-victims1
have suffered because of the victim’s death, in order to support the state’s case for
execution (Payne v. Tennessee 1991). Legal scholars record this as a major shift in
death penalty jurisprudence: before its inclusion in 1991, capital sentencing was
generally understood to be limited to interrogating the character, deservingness,
and dangerousness of the offender in order to determine whether he deserves death
by execution or life in prison.
After observing the father reading his poem above and dozens of other victims’
family members testifying in capital trials, I found VIT as a phenomenon best
understood through the sociological concept of performance. With such a public
show of sorrow in fact, there was no way to avoid thinking of it as first and fore-
most as a performance. Labeling it a social performance does not suggest that the
emotions of the witnesses are in any way insincere. Instead the concept specifies
that victim participation is necessarily a public (as opposed to private) enactment
of a role that is social (as opposed to theatric) in that it involves real-world, social-
ly structured relationships, produced both by and for groups of people with their
own sets of norms and goals. Testimony involves a double consciousness on the
part of the actors who participate. Whether they like it or not, co-victims must
give their testimony in front of an audience. Testifying co-victims must simulta-
neously cope with emotions usually managed with in private, and a set of demands
made by a public appearance. Institutionalizing such a social performance has an
effect on the relationships of groups of courtroom actors, as well as the capital pun-
ishment institution generally, as will be discussed at length.
Most scholarship addressing victim participation in death penalty sentencing
focuses on two questions, the first empirical and the second normative. First, does
VIT affect sentence outcomes? Most commentators agree that victim impact testi-
mony makes jurors more likely to vote for the death penalty, though to different
degrees and for different reasons. Second, should VIT be a part of capital sentenc-
ing? Does participation at trial benefit co-victims? Does it fit within the moral and
legal framework of capital sentencing?
In the passages that follow, I argue that these questions put the cart before the
proverbial horse. Scholars should understand how VIT works before asking whether
1. “Co-victim” is sometimes used to describe surviving family members of homicide victims (Reed
and Blackwell 2006). In this article, I will describe this group using “victim” and “co-victim” interchange-
ably, except when necessary to distinguish between the deceased victim and the surviving family members.
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it should be allowed. In this article I ask: How does victim participation in death
penalty trials function in practice? And what do the practices tell us about the con-
troversies surrounding victim participation in capital trials? Drawing on hundreds of
hours of observations in fifteen capital trials in six states in the Northeast, Midwest,
and Southern regions of the United States, I argue that this ethnographic study
changes the way the institutionalization of VIT must be understood.
The article proceeds as follows. First, I provide a review of the role of victims
in the US criminal justice system and the debate surrounding the United States
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on victim participation in death penalty sentencing.
Second, we enter the courtroom to see what victim participation in capital sentenc-
ing looks like in practice. Viewed through the lens of performance, I argue that co-
victims’ social role in capital courtrooms is primarily that of a group of mourners,
which gives them a socially sacred status. The discussion and conclusion emphasize
that the institutionalization of VIT in capital trials does not “balance” the trial
between offender and victim, but instead privileges victims because of their status
as mourners. This privileging depends, however, on victims’ performance of what
scholars consider a “culturally successful” ritual (Alexander 2006).
BACKGROUND
Death Is Different: The Strange World of Capital Murder Trials
In the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States, an offender’s sen-
tence is decided without a trial. Most are instead negotiated between prosecution
and defense as part of a plea agreement. For the approximately 10 percent of crimi-
nal cases that do go to trial,2 the judge, who may or may not hear evidence regard-
ing the offender’s social history, sentences the offender in large part according to
state and federal guidelines. In order for a state to pursue the death penalty, howev-
er, the United States Supreme Court requires not only a trial, but also a sentencing
decision made by a jury.3 If a defendant is found guilty of capital murder at a trial
where the death penalty is a possible punishment, the jury reconvenes and hears
testimony about the “character and propensities of the offender” (Woodson v. North
Carolina 1976) from prosecution and defense witnesses. The jury then votes on
whether the offender deserves death, as argued by the prosecution, or life in prison
as argued by the defense.
This sort of second trial called a “penalty phase” is meant to provide jurors
with information about the defendant’s character so that the sentence is appropriate
not only to the crime, but also to him as a person.4 While penalty phase trials are
2. This varies considerable according to circumstance, but is a fair simplified average (Galanter
2004).
3. There are occasional exceptions to this rule. For example, Ohio allows a defendant to be sentenced
before a three-judge panel. There is also ongoing litigation in Delaware, Florida, and Alabama about wheth-
er judges should be allowed to override jury sentencing decisions.Hurst v. Florida (2016) most recently sug-
gests judicial override might prove unconstitutional.
4. I use the masculine pronoun throughout because the vast majority of capital defendants are male.
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familiar in their form—opening and closing statements, defendant’s council table
and prosecution table, objections, bench conferences, and witnesses called to testify,
for example—their content is less familiar to the US criminal justice system. For
days, weeks, or months, and to differing degrees of effectiveness depending on the
relative skill and effort of the participants, prosecution and defense use a variety of
tactics that they think will persuade jurors to link the defendant’s particular charac-
ter to a lesser or greater punishment. Testimony might be taken from physicians,
friends and family of the defendant, survivors of the victim, psychiatrists, psycholo-
gists, statisticians, religious figures, prison guards, and others, called by both prose-
cution and defense. The testimony of these witnesses can be used for opposite ends,
depending on whether it is presented by the prosecution or the defense. A psychia-
trist might explain a defendant’s impairment at the time of the crime, or might sug-
gest that the defendant will always be a danger to others. A clergyman might
testify that the defendant has found God and is therefore salvageable or testify that
the family of the victim has been deeply spiritually affected by their loved one’s
death. This article focuses on just one aspect of the capital penalty phase: victim
participation. Victims have not always had a role in death penalty proceedings, but
in the last forty years have become integrated into many aspects of the US criminal
justice system.
Victims in US Criminal Justice
Victim participation in modern criminal legal proceedings re-emerged in the
United States during the last four decades. Prior to that, one of the principal devel-
opments of the civil law system beginning in medieval England and later in the for-
mation of the colonial United States was to separate crime victims from the state’s
condemnation of criminal activity. This was because of a concern with a neverend-
ing cycle of violence and revenge between offender and offended. The
“impassionate” hand of the state was meant to punish offenders without a personal
or emotional agenda and replace the cycle of violence. The separation of the vic-
tim’s desires and the justice system’s impartiality was a core component of the
American criminal justice system (Acker and Mastrocinque 2006; Hostettler 2006,
2009; Langbein 2003).
During the latter half of the twentieth century, however, victims’ exclusion
from the criminal justice system drew protests from across the political spectrum.
Individualized sentencing and rehabilitation programs for offenders, which had
shaped modern US criminal justice, began to be criticized as ineffective. Advocates
for reform of the criminal justice system generally split into two camps. The first
lobbied for a renewed effort at rehabilitation. The second argued that the criminal
justice system coddled offenders, and that victims were suffering. This second fac-
tion was successful at dominating public opinion and political agendas for several
reasons. For one, it found support in several different areas along the political spec-
trum. Politically conservative groups were concerned that defendant’s rights were
being overemphasized. On an international stage, the specter of the Eichmann trials
loomed large. Holocaust victims gave evidence of atrocities on a scale not
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previously imagined. Famously chronicled by Hannah Arendt (1963), the demon-
stration of the suffering of Holocaust victims impacted publics well beyond its
courtroom. At the same time, the burgeoning second-wave women’s rights move-
ment publicized the plight of rape and sexual assault victims, who they described as
doubly victimized: first by offenders and second by a state who treated them as
complicit or even active participants in their assaults.
From these disparate concerns, a victims’ rights coalition emerged as one of
the new social movements of the late 1960s. In part because of this coalition, a
more punitive model of criminal justice began to replace the rehabilitative. Offend-
er rights were posed as antithetical to the interests of victims and victims were rein-
tegrated into the criminal justice system (Barker 2007; Garland 2001; Weed
1995).5 The victims’ rights movement was institutionalized during the decades that
followed, through local and national legislation. During the 1980s and 90s, at least
thirty-two state legislatures passed laws allowing varying degrees of victim participa-
tion in a variety of criminal procedures, most commonly allowing victims to write
statements to the judges responsible for sentencing (Acker and Mastrocinque
2006).
Victim participation in death penalty trials holds a peculiar place in this histo-
ry. Though death penalty trials are few compared to noncapital criminal proceed-
ings,6 the use of victim impact testimony in capital trials has received a large
amount of attention from the judiciary, scholars, and other interested parties. This
is because the death penalty is so often a lightning rod in criminal justice debates,
but also because of the increased protection afforded capital defendants in compari-
son to noncapital criminal defendants. According to modern US Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the capital sentencing procedure is meant to focus on the character,
dangerousness, and deservingness of the offender. Because of the “qualitative differ-
ence” between a life sentence and a death sentence, the Court stated that there
should be a corresponding difference in the amount of attention given to the appro-
priateness of the punishment for offenders in capital cases (Woodson v. North Caro-
lina 1976). The relatively extensive consideration of the defendant’s character that
has resulted requires more resources than noncapital sentencing. Capital defense
teams spend months and years investigating their clients’ social histories. Investiga-
tions may span generations, states, and even countries (Cooley 2004, 2005; Haney
2003, 2004, 2005; Sarat 1998; White 2006). Dozens of witnesses present days,
weeks, and sometimes months of testimony about the character of the offender.
This wide-ranging attention to capital offenders’ social histories has been a large
target for critics who argue that criminal defendants get too much attention
generally.7
5. This is not to suggest that victims’ rights are necessarily antithetical to defense rights. The align-
ment of the victims’ rights movement with a conservative political agenda in the United States is the result
of a group of historically specific factors. Barker (2007) points out that some victims’ rights movements were
in fact part of a more restorative model of justice in some jurisdictions in the United States and abroad.
6. Of the more than one million Americans convicted of felonies, fewer than one hundred death pen-
alty trials take place each year.
7. On the other hand, advocates for capital defendants argue that many do not get adequate represen-
tation at all (see, for example, Bright 1994).
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In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court took up the question of whether the
inclusion of victim testimony in capital sentencing might correct this perceived
imbalance. Some states had incorporated victim testimony into capital trials, gener-
ally following the procedures established in noncapital criminal proceedings. There
was one large difference, however. The deceased victims themselves could not testi-
fy, so friends and family were permitted to speak for them in some jurisdictions.
These “co-victims,” as they began to be called, were asked to submit written state-
ments to jurors, while others were encouraged to testify in person. In other jurisdic-
tions, co-victims were not allowed to participate at all. Facing pressure from both
victims’ advocates who wanted increased access to courts, and defense advocates
who argued that victim testimony was inappropriate to the goals of capital sentenc-
ing, the United States Supreme Court addressed this varied use of victim testimony
in 1987.
In Booth vs. Maryland (1987), the Court reviewed a capital trial in which two
men were convicted of robbing and murdering an elderly couple in their home in
the middle of the night. In a five–four opinion, the majority held that VIT was
irrelevant to the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime and
therefore inappropriate at sentencing. It also stated that the introduction of VIT
created a risk that juries would impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capri-
cious manner in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Whether the victim was of
good character and whether the family could effectively articulate that character
should not have bearing on the defendant’s sentence. The opinion concluded:
One can understand the grief and anger of the family caused by the brutal
murders in this case, and there is no doubt that jurors generally are aware
of these feelings. But the formal presentation of this information by the
State can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it
from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime
and the defendant. (Booth v. Maryland 1987, 508–09)
Thus, victims were barred from presenting written or oral statements to the trial
court about the harm done to them as a result of the murder. Two years later, the
Court also banned the use of VIT to tell jurors about the good personal qualities of
the victim (South Carolina v. Gathers 1989). But this defense victory was short-
lived. As victims’ rights were increasingly institutionalized in noncapital criminal
proceedings across the country, the call for their inclusion in death penalty trials
became louder. Four years after the Booth decision, in 1991, the Supreme Court
again accepted a case that addressed the rights of victims during capital sentencing.
This time, the makeup of the Court had changed. Appointments by Presidents Rea-
gan and George H. W. Bush assured that the justices as a group were more conser-
vative. By accepting the petition of Payne v. Tennessee (1991), the Court heard
arguments about a death penalty trial that involved a brutal attack on a woman
and two children. In another five–four opinion, the majority sided with victims’
advocates. The majority opinion stated in no uncertain terms that co-victim testi-
mony should be admitted during capital sentencing. The decision emphasized that
VIT serves to give jurors more information about the “specific harm” caused by the
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defendant, a type of evidence “long considered by sentencing authorities.” It went
on to reason that VIT was appropriate to capital sentencing because it balanced
the capital defendants’ right to present character evidence at trial, explicitly over-
ruling the Court’s previous decision in Booth v. Maryland (1987) and weighing vic-
tims’ rights against defense rights.
Consequently a new era in capital punishment sentencing was ushered in. Vic-
tim impact evidence was envisioned as balancing the testimony describing the
defendant’s character. In the twenty years since Payne was decided, nearly all states
in the United States that authorize the death penalty have allowed the use of vic-
tim impact testimony at trial. Today, twenty-eight out of thirty states with the
death penalty explicitly permit victims to give written or oral statements to the
jury. The three that do not explicitly allow it (Montana, New Hampshire, and
Wyoming) have ambiguous policies.8 Victim impact testimony featured at each of
the fifteen trials I observed.
The Scholarly Debate and the Role of Performance
The dispute about the role of victims at capital trials continues despite the
Supreme Court’s rulings on the subject. These debates have developed along two
general lines. The first line is empirical: scholars ask whether VIT affects jury out-
comes. The second is normative, and inquires into the matter of whether VIT
should be included in capital trials.
First, scholars have tried to assess VIT’s impact on capital jury sentencing.
Most agree that the inclusion of victim impact testimony makes capital jurors more
likely to vote for the death penalty, though to different degrees and for different
reasons. Bandes (1996) argues that the empathy aroused by VIT makes jurors gener-
ally unable to empathize with defendants. This line of argument has been qualified
by empirical studies that suggest jurors differentiate between victims who are
“worthy” or “unworthy” of sympathy (Sundby 2003). From interviews with thou-
sands of capital jurors across the country, scholars have asserted that the victims’
race (Haney 2004), gender (Williams, Demuth, and Holcomb 2007), and social sta-
tus (Phillips 1997) have been found to influence jurors’ abilities to empathize with
victims (see also Eisenberg, Garvey, and Wells 2003; Johnson 2003, Logan 2000,
2006, Luginbuhl and Burkhead 1995). Experiments confirm that mock juries share
the tendency to sentence more harshly if they can personally relate to victims
(Myers and Arbuthnot 1999; Nadler and Rose 2002). In reviewing all of these stud-
ies, however, Karp and Warshaw (2006) find that VIT makes a slight but statistical-
ly insignificant difference to jurors’ decisions, regardless of whether or not they
empathize with the victims.
The second and more complex line of debate involves questions about whether
victims should testify in capital trials. There are several frames through which this
question is asked. Legal scholars argue whether VIT makes evidentiary sense. Some
8. According to the Death Penalty Information Center, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legal-
issues-states-allow-victim-impact-statements
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stress that the harm done to the victim is factored into the charge of capital homi-
cide and that co-victim participation of has no place in sentencing. Others—like
the ruling jurisprudence—reason that the harm done to victims should be used to
“balance” the character testimony presented to mitigate the defendant’s guilt.9
Two major lines of inquiry dominate debates around the moral questions. First,
there is argumentation about the benefit VIT can bring to those mourning the vic-
tims. Some argue that the ability to testify provides co-victims with much needed
closure, whereas others have found that involvement in capital trials can overly
burden or retraumatize them.10 Acker and Karp’s (2006) first-person accounts from
victims in capital trials provide the best evidence of victims’ varied experiences in
capital trials. From these accounts, it is fair to say that participation in courtroom
testimony helps some victims and retraumatizes others, and that there are factors
that effect participation that may be as important as the testimony itself. Goodrum
(2013), for example, demonstrates that the relationship between the prosecutor and
the co-victims is key in determining co-victims’ feelings about capital trials.
Others evaluate VIT as part of a resurgence of emotion in contemporary West-
ern law (Bandes 1996; Garvey 2000; Sarat 2001; Arrigo and Williams 2003). The
classical framework of the Western legal institution as a rational arena, free of emo-
tion, has been questioned for some decades now. Bandes (1999), Garland (2001),
Karstedt (2002), and Pratt (2000), among others, have pointed out that many
aspects of the contemporary American legal system integrate emotion into a realm
supposedly reserved for reason and rationality alone. But Bandes (2009) argues that
capital law has failed to grapple with the role of emotion. This failure means legal
decision makers cannot accurately predict VIT’s effects.
Recognizing VIT as emotionally complex brings us closer to a fuller under-
standing of how victim participation works in capital trials, But “emotional” can
mean any number of things. To understand how the emotional nature of VIT
impacts capital trials, it must be studied in practice, in the context of the capital
courtroom. Bandes (1999, 2009) argues for a “contextualization” of victim impact
testimony in its institutional and psychosocial context. For this, a theory of per-
formativity and ritual is needed.
As Austin (1975) first described, speech acts must be recognized as performa-
tive. Further, speech acts do not exist without bodies and relationships. Goffman
(1959, 1961) conceptualizes social worlds as composed of a series of dramaturgical
performances. Such performances are not entertainment—they are reflexive process-
es through which humans recognize themselves and others. The actors in capital
trials are not only expressing emotion, they are performing for one another—wit-
ness for jury, judge for audience, and audience members for one another, for exam-
ple. These performances are not insincere. Rather the Goffmanian concept of
performance emphasizes actors’ desire to be understood, even within the constraints
of the legal setting.
9. For a detailed discussion of the evidentiary role of VIT, see Engle (2000) or Logan (1999, 2000).
10. A study examining mock jurors’ responses to victim impact testimony by Nadler and Rose (2002)
influenced a line of subsequent studies on this point.
1162 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
Alexander (2006) develops a framework for analyzing this emotion-laden com-
municative work. Following Durkheim ([1915] 1965), he emphasizes how perform-
ances can build community relationships through ritual in public settings.
Alexander (2006) draws on Goffman (1959, 1961) and Schechner (1993), among
others, to develop the concept of the contemporary “social performance,” which is
a secular communicative act that has the capacity to build solidarity between actors
and their audiences. When effective, such social performances bring actors and
their audiences together in a ritual-like affirmation of a cultural notion held dear. If
not effective, social performances are witnessed as inauthentic, and solidarity is not
achieved. As I will show, VIT institutionalizes just such social performances. VIT is
a rare act in the criminal justice system where bureaucracy and discipline often sup-
plant any potential for ritual solidarity.
According to the Supreme Court, VIT is intended to serve two purposes: to
provide information about the character of the deceased victim, and to describe the
harm that the crime has done. In practice, it does much more. As I will show,
much of the audience’s focus throughout sentencing turns on the emotions of the
surviving victims and their supporters who are present in the courtroom. This is
not surprising if we conceptualize them not as legal actors, but as mourners who
have lost loved ones. By conceptualizing VIT as a social performance of mourning,
I show how victims hold the potential to structure the relationships in capital
courtrooms in a way that other groups do not.
RESEARCH METHODS
There is a strange lack of data about capital trials in the United States. The
United States Department of Justice Bureau of Statistics collects extensive data
on homicides, arrests, and prison sentences for convicted murderers; advocacy
organizations such as the Death Penalty Information Center and Human Rights
Watch have extensive information on the people on death row and state execu-
tion processes; and the National Center for State Courts records all types of crim-
inal sentences, but no national organization tracks when or where death penalty
trials are happening around the country, nor their results. A few states and locali-
ties have begun to require such information, but there is no national compendium
of information about death penalty trials in the United States.11 Without this
information we cannot make systematic claims about death penalty sentencing tri-
als, and trial practices remain disconnected from the larger role of capital
punishment.
The present study remedies this in part by observing selected capital sentenc-
ing trials in order to begin to identify common practices. Unlike previous studies
that focus on trials in one state or another, I chose to attempt to compile data that
reaches toward national representation. In order to observe as nationally
11. I confirmed this with experts in the field, including representatives from the Death Penalty
Information Center and the Department of Justice.
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representative a group of trials as possible, I used a systematic sample.12 In lieu of any
definitive population from which to sample, I used newspaper accounts of American capi-
tal trials compiled by the American Judicature Society.13 These provided a sketch of
where capital trials take place around the country. I combined these with previous findings
suggesting that trial outcomes vary by county demographic differential (Lofquist 2001;
Gershowitz 2010), level of funding available for indigent defense (Tabak 1994; Bright
1994, 1995; Vick 1995; White 2006; Redick, MacLean, and Truett 2008), and race of vic-
tim and defendant (Baldus, Pulaski, and Woodworth 1990; Oggletree 2002; Baldus and
Woodworth 2003; Fleury-Steiner 2004; Allen and Clubb 2008). I then chose selectively
state and federal death penalty sentencing trials for tracking and observation, with the
goal of maximum variation on these characteristics.
During 2007, 2008, and 2009, I observed three federal and twelve state trials in
Pennsylvania (2), New York (2 federal), Virginia (1 Federal), Louisiana (3), Texas (6),
and Illinois (1). Trials ranged from several days to several weeks. In the tradition of the
multi-sited ethnography (Burawoy 2000; Falzon 2009), I treated each trial as a site in a
collective “social world” (Strauss 1977), bound not by space but by institutional logic.
Each trial was of course unique in its arrangement of actors, locations, and circumstances,
yet undeniably interconnected through its mutual dependence on a shared group of insti-
tutions and institutional actors. In every trial, the workings of the criminal law in the
United States set the scene for much of the action; in every trial, capital prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and expert witnesses were networked, to greater or lesser extent, to oth-
er others in their fields. Trial actors also shared sets of cultural norms, as I will discuss. In
total I observed more than eight hundred hours in fifteen courtrooms. I also interviewed
trial actors, including prosecutors and their staff, defense attorneys and mitigation investi-
gators, victims’ supporters, courtroom staff, defendants’ family members, expert witnesses,
and members of the media.14
Following the “reflexive turn” of ethnographers in sociology and anthropology
during the 1980s, I make use of not only my interviewees’ observations and emo-
tions in my analysis, but also my own. Death penalty trials are indeed emotional
proceedings; pretending to be a completely “detached” observer would be ingenu-
ous. Instead I follow others who make use of their emotional reactions to fieldwork
by leveraging them as data when illuminating.15
12. The technique of “systematic” rather than random sampling was done in accordance with the
National Science Foundation’s “Qualitative Research Design and Methods: Strengths, and Shared and
Unique Standards,” found at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/ses/soc/ISSQR_workshop_rpt.pdf. More information
onmy method is available.
13. Two hundred and thirty-three news reports from 2005, compiled from the American Judicature
Society Capital Case Data Project, available at http://www.ajs.org/jc/death//jc_death.asp.
14. The vast majority of these interviews were informal, conducted in the hallways, bathrooms, and
cafeterias around the courtrooms I observed. I also conducted fifteen formal interviews with capital defense
attorneys, which I also draw on. I was unable to interview the defendants themselves, jury members, and
judges, all of whom were barred from talking about the cases, as they were ongoing.
15. In this I draw on the tradition of ethnographer and feminist researchers (e.g., Smith 1974; Clifford
and Marcus 1986; Luhrmann 1989; Ulysse 2007) who have an epistemological commitment to recognizing
one’s own subjectivity in the field. Though a researcher is not a member of the field of study per se, his or her
reactions to the field should be explored as data. For some recent discussion of the role that emotions should
play in social scientific research, see Hubbard, Backett-Milburn, and Kemmer (2001), Hume and Mulcock
(2004), and Dickson-Swift et al. (2009).
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To compare my observations with the information available to appellate
courts, I also obtained trial transcripts whenever possible. My ability to do so
depended on the goodwill of the court reporters in each trial; transcripts are not
generally made available to the public until the “official” record is filed, often
months after trials conclude, and can be prohibitively expensive. I was lucky to
meet five court reporters who shared their electronic copies with me soon after I
completed my observations. I used these to compare the official court record with
my ethnographic notes.
The data and analyses culled from this research are the first ethnographic data
compiled from multiple capital trials across the country. They are preliminary in
this sense, and are meant to open doors to further exploration.
MOURNERS IN THE COURT: SPACE, ACTION, AND
RELATIONSHIP
Appellate courts rely on trial transcripts to issue legal rulings. Yet transcription
systematically erases information that I argue should be used to form a more honest
evaluation of victim participation in capital trials. For one, the highly emotional
content of victim testimony is drastically tamped down through the process of legal
transcription. VIT is rendered almost lifeless when separated from the tone, facial
expressions, and body language of grieving witnesses, as well as the audience mem-
bers’ and jurors’ responses. Second, transcription captures co-victims’ on the witness
stand, but their presence in the courtroom during the trial goes well beyond the
witness stand. Together these factors produce a transcript that bears little resem-
blance to the role of victims in the courtroom.
I begin by describing how VIT reads after it has been transcribed, drawing on
the five transcripts I acquired. I then detail how victim participation in death pen-
alty sentencing actually works from an observational perspective.
In the five transcripts I obtained, the prosecutor’s case for death began by call-
ing between two and six co-victims to testify about the victim’s character and the
impact of their loss. The examples below capture the essence of this testimony. By
and large, VIT features three common narratives which are shaped with details spe-
cific to the victim. First, there is a positive, even “angelic” portrait of the character
of the victim. Here the best friend of a murdered university student described the
victim:
He was an angel. Really. I know that people say that about lots of people,
but he was really the nicest person I knew. He would do anything for me.
And he loved his nephews. They were always talking about him.
Second, a loved one describes the last time he or she heard from the victims. In
the below case, the mother of a victim at another trial described the last time she
spoke to her daughter on the phone:
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She called me a couple of days before she got killed, she said, Mommy—
the phone rang, must have been about 11:30—that was unusual. I started
not to answer it, but when I heard her voice on the answering machine,
Mommy, I pick up the phone. She says, I just called you to tell you I love
you. . . . Next thing I knew, the detectives was at the door and they was
telling me she was shot.
Finally, co-victims testify about the effect of the loss on their family. Here another
mother testified about how her family’s life was affected by the murder of her oldest
son:
My family is just crushed. My younger son has said none of us look the
same, none of us sound the same. I know it’s only been just a little over a
year, but we’re just not the same family. We’ll recover. We know he’s
with the Lord and we’re going to see him. It’s not that. It’s just that for
now, it’s a very hard recovery. It was so sudden and tragic. He had just
recovered from cancer. Spent a year fighting cancer. And after all the
struggles he had, and he just was about to realize some of the benefits of
all that he had worked for and then he—it was all over.
These are typical of VIT, though they are considerably abridged; the above para-
graphs are embedded in forty-, fifty-, and seventy-odd pages of transcripted victim
impact testimony, respectively.
Prosecutors then typically draw on these narratives from VIT in their closing
arguments at sentencing. They commonly ask jurors to take into account the suffer-
ing that the defendant has caused the friends and family of the victim. In the case
of the murdered daughter above, the prosecutor told jurors in closing:
Focus on the unspeakable hell that he [the defendant] put those families
through . . . because of that man, because he decided to go hunting on the
streets of this city, those people’s families have nothing left to hug but
memories, and we’re asking you to remember them.
Thus, from the trial transcripts, readers are most likely to get a sense that the vic-
tim of the murder was a good or even exceptional person, that the family and
friends of the victim have suffered greatly, and that the jury should consider these
surviving co-victims’ pain in their decision about the defendant’s sentence.16
VIT in the Courtroom
Legal transcription captures little, however, about the totality of co-victim par-
ticipation in death penalty sentencing. Co-victims and victims’ supporters are
16. Logan (2000, 2006) writes that victims are also likely to be asked by prosecutors to give their opin-
ion on the stand that the offender should be sentenced to death. I did not record this in my fieldnotes,
though looking back, I do believe it may have occurred in one or two cases.
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involved in multiple relationships in the courtroom, visible to anyone in atten-
dance. They testify, but they do much more.17
First, I observed testifying co-victims relate with lawyers, audience members,
and jurors in ways that were not recorded in transcripts. To the best of my memory,
in all but one trial I observed, co-victim witnesses cried on the stand. In several,
they sobbed and had to take breaks to compose themselves. Tissues were routinely
handed to them, as were glasses of water. Their pain was not just described but
reenacted in front of jurors, judge, and audience members. These performances were
met with almost universal empathy from the people in the courtroom, which were
not transcribed. Audience members cried, passed tissues, held hands, and comforted
one another. I saw jurors weep, and I was moved to tears on more than one occa-
sion. Though I have never experienced a violent attack on a loved one, memories
of lost loves and lost opportunities flooded me. In the case in which the father tes-
tified, recounted in this article’s opening, a defense attorney even called attention
to his own crying during victim testimony. After the victim’s father read the poem,
the lead defense attorney stood up and asked the judge for a mistrial. He said that
“people in the courtroom, most notably at defense table, most notably myself,” were
visibly moved by the testimony and the jurors might have been affected by seeing
them cry. He said he, for one, thought his crying might have been de facto ineffec-
tiveness of counsel. In short, VIT testimony was often heart-wrenching for everyone
in the courtroom, not only victims’ supporters.
Victim participation in capital trials also goes beyond giving formal testimony.
Off the stand, co-victims’ role in the trial is entirely untranscribed, but is a key fac-
tor in structuring the relationships in the courtroom. All action in the courtroom is
organized by the material and symbolic demarcation of the “front stage,” where the
action takes place, and the “audience.”18 Front stage actors include the judge, sit-
ting in the front and center of the courtroom on a raised bench with court reporter
and clerk desks in front; defense and prosecution teams, seated at identical large
rectangular tables on either side of the judge; and a jury, usually seated in a cor-
doned off box of some sort. The verbal exchanges of trial actors that are captured
by transcript take place only in this front stage, except in the unusual event that
front stage actors bring attention elsewhere. Though the audience is an active force
in the courtroom, it is absent from the action captured by the court reporters. Vic-
tim participation is therefore only considered part of the proceedings when a co-
victim comes from the audience or backstage and enters the front stage to sit in a
witness seat.
But in my observations, victims’ supporters in capital trial courtrooms were as
dominant a presence as the “major” players. I regularly encountered and made note
of action driven by the judge, attorneys, jury members, defendant, or courtroom
17. It is worth mentioning here that one relationship that was surprisingly absent from the majority of
victim interactions was that between the co-victims and the defendant himself. From fictional accounts of
criminal trials, one might expect a confrontation between these two parties. And though I did see two
defendants read statements of remorse, at times addressing the victims’ family directly, I did not witness any
dramatic interaction between these two groups beyond this. For the most part, expressions of anger and sor-
row were mediated through other relationships.
18. I employ Goffman’s (1959) terms here to demonstrate the dramaturgical nature of the courtroom.
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staff. I also found myself just as likely to be drawn to the audience members, com-
posed mainly of the victim’s friends and families.19 Audience members were nor-
mally seated on wooden benches arranged in divided rows like church pews, and
were themselves divided. In some courtrooms this was formally marked, whether by
ragged pieces of paper taped up on the ends of rows of benches, or professionally
produced signs standing at the courtroom entrance. The signs indicated seats
reserved for “media” and “family,” meaning victims’ family, and less often sections
for lawyers’ staffs and defendants’ families. Even in courtrooms without formally
marked divisions, audience members divided themselves in similar ways. The vic-
tims’ family and friends sat in the pews nearest the prosecutor; the media, if any,
gathered in a less prominent area toward the back; and the rows closest to the
defendant held defense supporters, if any were present. In all of the trials I observed
save for one, victims’ supporters greatly outnumbered defense supporters.
This setup was not incidental. The division of the sides structured an unspoken
dynamic in the courtroom that was palpable to spectators who entered. Visitors
who were alien to the courtroom revealed the strength of this invisible orchestra-
tion. Upon entering, unfamiliar visitors were likely to sit down in the first available
row. After sitting for a few moments, they would glance around and get a feel for
the room. In several courtrooms, visitors became visibly discomforted when they
discovered themselves to have unwittingly taken a wrong position in the space.
One man found himself sitting in the defense section when he meant to support
the prosecution. He caught the eye of the victim’s advocate—a professional from
the prosecutor’s office—and quickly realized that she was keeping charge of the vic-
tim’s family. He fidgeted, waiting to reposition himself during a break, and then
finally snuck over to the appropriate row, nodding at the advocate like a child
eager to be acknowledged for his good behavior.
As an observer, I also experienced a difference in attitude toward me depend-
ing on where I sat in the courtroom. Though I would always introduce myself, I
was treated as a “graduate student writing about murder trials,” differently depend-
ing on where I was seated in the courtroom. In one trial, I sat with the defense sup-
porters who were mostly young legal clerks. Though I shared a courtroom, lobby,
elevators, and cafeteria with the co-victims and victims’ advocate for several weeks,
no victims or their supporters ever made eye contact with me. They acknowledged
my presence only with hostility. When we came upon one another, they averted
their eyes, changed topics of conversation, fell silent, or walked away. It never felt
appropriate to introduce myself, and I remained vigilantly formal. In other trials,
when I sat with victims’ supporters, I was able to have conversations with family
members and friends of the victim.20 One conversation made especially clear to me
how much anger simmered under the surface between the two groups. During an
afternoon break I found myself washing my hands next to the wife of the victim in
19. Though most capital proceedings are open to the public, I was surprised how sparsely they were
generally populated. Though a few of the trials I observed garnered large attention from surrounding com-
munities and media, the majority were attended by victims’ supporters, and some days not at all.
20. This was easier when victims’ supporters were in smaller groups of two or three and not accompa-
nied by a representative from the district attorney’s office. The implications of this will be discussed in this
article’s conclusion.
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the bathroom nearest the courtroom. We could not help but interact as we both
reached for the paper towel dispenser, and I said, “I’m so sorry for your loss. . . . I
can’t understand what it must be like going through this.” Having wet her face
from the faucet and in the process of mopping her eyes with a paper towel, she
shook her head violently and replied in a voice that felt too loud for the space:
“What I don’t understand is how anybody could represent that slimeball!” I was not
surprised by this burst of anger, as I could see it smoldering in her gestures and
expressions in the courtroom as I sat nearby. But I was surprised that her anger was
directed at the defense team and not the defendant himself.
Victim and defense supporters were not only separated spatially in the court-
rooms. Groups also formed their own internal patterns of behavior. In fourteen out
of fifteen courtrooms, victims’ supporters far outnumbered the defense supporters.
Victims’ supporters also tended to look more organized and better prepared for their
appearances. Here are excerpts from my notes on the morning the penalty phase
began. Victim and defense supporters filled the courtroom.
The scene in the courtroom is more chaotic and noisy today. Attorneys
and staff are searching through document boxes and the audience seems
more crowded and talkative than they did during the guilt phase of trial.
Then the judge enters suddenly and a bailiff calls the court to order.
Everyone quiets down, stands up, and sits back down when the judge ges-
tures. There is a short pause while attorneys and courtroom staff finish
shuffling their papers. The judge looks like he is polishing his glasses. I
hear the courtroom door open behind me, and turn around to see a slight
teenage boy wearing a huge red T-shirt down to his knees and black
shorts almost touching his ankles framed in the doorway. He pauses for a
moment, surveying the scene with a scowl, and then walks a slow, deliber-
ate lope down the center aisle of the audience. He doesn’t stop until he
comes almost to the knee-wall separating the audience from the front
stage. He turns to face the packed front row and then waits, arms folded,
standing next to a sign marked “Defendant’s Family.” The women at the
end of the row gather their bags and jackets into their laps to make room
for him. They squeeze together, and he sits down. I then notice that a
skinny and tense-jawed young woman carrying a sleeping infant is behind
him. She is blatantly glaring at the judge and jury. She looks like she
wants to kill them, and I assume she is a family member or friend of the
defendant who is angry at the conviction. The people in the row squeeze
together more to make room for her. The courtroom door slams shut.
Many eyes follow these actions.
On the other side of the courtroom, already seated in a section of the audi-
ence marked “Victim’s Family,” is a group of several dozen professionally
dressed people. A few have been in the audience for the whole trial, but
most are new. Also new today is their attire: they are more formally dressed
and each has a pin about six inches in diameter fastened to the left side of
his or her shirt. On every pin is the face of a smiling young man: the vic-
tim. Collectively this group appears solemn; anticipatory but also nervous.
The prosecutor offers his opening statement and calls his first witness—
one of many co-victims to testify. As the morning progresses, defense
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supporters are agitated and fidgety. Groups of two or three of them walk
in and out of the courtroom with some frequency, banging the door each
time. Victim supporters alternately laugh, cry, and nod along with the vic-
tim impact testimony. They put their arms around each other and enter
and exit the courtroom en masse, only during breaks. By mid-morning,
several jurors look to be crying as victims’ family members continue to
testify. At some point the prosecutor puts a box of tissues on the knee-
wall in front of the jury, and the victim supporters are passing around
tissues of their own. Just before noon, as his last piece of evidence, the prose-
cutor plays a recording of the victim’s last call to 911. Upon hearing the vic-
tim’s voice, two women sitting in the “Victim’s Family” section begin
sobbing loudly. Jury members’ heads jerk toward them, looking wide-eyed
like deer caught in headlights. A few women in the defense family section
jump up. The judge instructs the jury to disregard the sobs and to exit quickly
for lunch as the state rests its case. (Extract from fieldnotes)
Several things are evident in the scene above. First, audience dynamics play a cen-
tral part in the courtroom action. Second, defense supporters and victim supporters
formed separate and contrasting groups, prompting a comparison between them.
The two groups in this trial played different roles in the audience. The defendant’s
family and friends gave off the impression of being angry with and defiant toward
the court and the jury. While some of the older women who sat in the front rows
dressed and acted respectfully toward the court, the younger defense supporters
made their angry feelings apparent. In contrast, the victim’s family and friends were
organized and established, almost at home in their individual and group expressions
of anguish. These dynamics were noticeable to anyone in the courtroom, but did
not make it into the legal record. The judge, jury, and members of the courtroom
staff all reacted to the two groups, but because their actions were not preserved on
the record they subsequently become institutionally invisible, unavailable for review
by academic researchers or appellate courts.
In this way, VIT organizes a show of compassion for co-victims. Looks of
empathy, glasses of water, and pats on the arm were plentiful and understandable,
but significant given their context. Together these gestures suggest trial court –as
institutions –grant legitimacy to the victims’ position. But in some trials, the insti-
tutional validation went a step further.
In five out of the fifteen cases I witnessed, a victims’ support person employed
by prosecution’s office was present at trial. In all cases female, these women func-
tioned not only to comfort and organize victims’ supporters, but also to negotiate
the group’s position in relationship to the judge. Victims’ advocates moved through
the courtrooms in ways that others did not. The barrier between audience and front
stage, normally a knee or waist-high wall as I have described, is protected and
breached to varying degrees. It marks the division between the legal actors and the
non-legal public. In larger courtrooms or where there was a lot of publicity sur-
rounding a particular case, this barrier is guarded by bailiffs or uniformed sheriffs.
Court reporters, judge’s clerks, bailiffs, and attorneys have on-going permission to
enter and exit the front stage, whereas witnesses are admitted only when they are
called to testify. All others stay out. Those that are admitted appear to have
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privileges granted by the court, marked in space in a way that the audience and the
jury can observe. In three cases victims’ assistants were also privileged in this way,
free to walk into and out of the front stage area like one of the clerks or judge’s
clerks. This reinforced the co-victims’ legitimate position in the courtroom in a way
I never saw legitimized for the defense.
A woman with the efficient air of a schoolmarm accompanies members of
the victim’s family at all times, sitting with them in the audience in the
courtroom, and talking with them when court is not in session. During
the state’s case for death, she holds a witness list and walks between the
prosecution table and the audience. She silently and verbally organizes
family members and their supporters, gesturing for them to sit, and whis-
pering quietly when something is confusing. The judge sees her entering
the front stage area and does not scold her as he did when an unautho-
rized witness stepped in before. The victims’ assistant is not reprimanded
for talking while the court is in session, or for walking in and out of the
courtroom at will. There is no equivalent on the defense’s side. (Extract
from fieldnotes)
The presence of the victim’s assistant elevates the status of co-victims and their
supporters in the courtroom. Observers see not only victims’ assistants’ gestures and
intentions, but also that they are condoned by the trial judge. This gives the vic-
tims’ families an institutionally supported role in the proceedings, regardless of
whether they testify. I never saw defense advocates given these same privileges.
Sometimes defense attorneys or mitigation specialists sat with defendants’ families.
They too would explain what was happening, and organize those who were called
to testify. Rather than receive support from the judge or court staff, however, I only
saw these figures reprimanded for talking during session.
Instead, courtroom actors routinely took their emotional cues from the victims’
supporters. This was made especially evident in two trials where audio/video record-
ings were used to describe, or as one prosecutor put it, “memorialize” the victim as
part of the victim impact testimony. The juries watched as montages of images of
the victim in various settings played on big screens. One featured the victim singing
in church, at a birthday party, and finally at home with his children. Music played
over the top, and jurors were riveted to the images on the screen. As sniffles began
to be audible in the audience, the attention in the courtroom became divided.
Jurors’ eyes moved back and forth between the video and the victim’s supporters in
the courtroom as they wiped their eyes, whispered to one another, and pressed close
together in their pews. When the video concluded, all eyes turned to them asking
for cues as to how they should react from the victims’ supporters rather than from
the judge’s instructions.
Out of the fifteen trials I observed, only three lacked the dominant presence of
victims and their supporters in the courtroom. In one trial, there were no victim
supporters in attendance and no testimony from victims. In two other trials co-
victims did testify, but off the stand they appeared disorganized and disrespectful of
the courts rules, in a manner similar to the defense supporters in the scene I
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described above. In these cases, the victims’ sorrow was less dominating a presence
in the courtroom, and the victim impact testimony was not as moving. Co-victims
were asked simply, “how do you feel about your loved one’s death?” and answers
tended to be general and vague.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Victim participation in practice involves a greater number of more complex
relationships than is obvious when trial actions are transcribed. In the vast majority
of the trials I observed, it shapes interactions among audience members, jurors,
defense supporters, and nontestifying victim supporters. This has consequences not
acknowledged in the Supreme Court’s decisions or adequately addressed by academ-
ic discussion of victim impact testimony.21 This section details these consequences.
I leave it to others to demonstrate that the Supreme Court, by allowing co-victims
to become testifying witnesses, may have altered jury verdicts or given victims more
satisfaction with capital proceedings. My observations demonstrate that its institu-
tionalization accomplishes other things. By making the performance of sorrow a
legal aspect of sentencing trials rather than just part of the audience dynamic, the
role of victims becomes doubly significant. If victim support is strong and a
“successful” social performance of mourning is achieved, audience members, jurors,
judges, and courtroom staff become party to the social rite of mourning. This both
steps up the antagonism between groups of victim and defense supporters, and
rewards those victims who have the resources to perform such a successful ritual.
The “Balancing” Argument
The Payne Court reasoned that VIT “balances” mitigation evidence. The
Court notes that the defendant’s girlfriend in Payne was allowed to introduce evi-
dence that the defendant was a caring father and partner, and that they met in
church. It reasons that the uniqueness of the victim should be introduced in a simi-
lar way; that the “parade” of witnesses praising the defendant should be balanced.
The Court’s argument that victims should be moved back into criminal proceedings
makes sense, given the cultural and political atmosphere of late twentieth-century
America. As Garland (2001) and Simon (2007) among others point out, courts,
legislatures, law enforcement agencies, and other publics were especially concerned
with the perceived plight of the crime victim during the last decades of the twenti-
eth century. The crime victim became the idealized subject of the law, central to a
host of legal and extralegal forums during the 1970s and beyond.22
21. However, there is a body of literature that looks at the ways that victims’ interactions with the
criminal justice system are traumatic in themselves. Reed and Blackwell (2006) provide a review of recent
literature, and Part I of Acker and Karp (2006) provides first-person accounts from capital co-victims. I
have not found any research, however, that looks specifically at the relationships between victims and other
trial actors during capital sentencing.
22. See Simon (2007), Chapter 3, for more on the victim’s idealized subjectivity.
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But my observations show that the institutionalization of victim impact testi-
mony does more than honor the victims. In almost all of the trials I observed, the
focus is not so much on the character of the deceased, but on the emotions of the
surviving family members and their supporters. Though the deceased victim’s char-
acter is praised during portions of victim impact testimonies, victim supporters who
sit in court receive more attention. In the most emotionally powerful trials, the vic-
tim is memorialized in a way that provides catharsis for friends and family. Their
grief, in turn, becomes part of, and in some cases the dominant tone in the court-
room. The mourners, rather than the judge, lawyers, or defendant, provide emotion-
al cues that command much of the courtroom’s focus.
This attention paid to victims’ supporters is not surprising given the cultural
role of mourning. Expressing sorrow in reaction to a loved one’s death is an old and
universal ritual, and mourners are given a special status and dispensation across cul-
tures. From the Australian Aboriginal tribes (Durkheim [1915] 1965), to mothers
mourning their dead infants in twentieth-century Brazil (Scheper-Hughes 1992),
mourners do more than express spontaneous emotion. They hold a powerful poten-
tial to organize community sentiments. As Durkheim would have it, the ritual com-
ing together of people who are mourning and the community members who support
them is a necessary step in affirming the importance of being a part of that society:
When someone dies, the family group to which he belongs feels itself less-
ened and, to react against this loss, it assembles. . . . Not only do the rela-
tives, who are affected the most directly, bring their own personal sorrow
to the assembly, but the society exercises a moral pressure over its mem-
bers, to put their sentiments in harmony with the situation. . . . A family
which allows one of its members to die without being wept for shows by
that very fact that it lacks moral unity and cohesion: it abdicates; it
renounces its existence. (Durkheim [1915] 1965, 445–46).
Thus victim’s family members, their supporters, and even those who do not know
the family but who witness their mourning, might be said to be under a moral and
social obligation to support the rituals. Whether at a funeral or at a capital sentenc-
ing hearing, witnesses to grief are socially compelled to show empathy with the
mourners. Close family members as well as distant community associates who do
not display empathy are judged as cold or inadequate.
As such, institutionally sanctioned acts of public mourning during death penal-
ty trials have the potential to culturally compel spectators to support victim’s family
members. When a successful performance of mourning is coupled with a prosecu-
tor’s argument to honor the victim’s family by voting for a death sentence, the
appeal for execution is equated with an entreaty for strong community. In
Alexander’s (2006) terms, the successful social performance unites the audience
with the victim. This has two consequences.
First, the potential for solidarity building of co-victim testimony must be con-
sidered in comparison to mitigation testimony, as the Supreme Court suggests.
While VIT makes victims worthy of empathy, mitigation testimony can work the
opposite way. Haney (2004, 2005) and others have catalogued how defense
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mitigation can be unfamiliar and even alienating to jurors and audience members.
Their narratives often involve family dysfunction, mental illness, physical and sexu-
al abuse, all of which which can be shameful and stigmatizing. While defense law-
yers might aim to promote solidarity by presenting such evidence about the
defendant, they face much greater cultural barriers than prosecuting attorneys. The
Supreme Court’s “balancing” metaphor, from this perspective, makes little sense.
Second, we must consider those acts of public mourning that are less
“successful” in Alexander’s (2006) terms. In Booth vs. Maryland (1987), the Court is
rightfully concerned that institutionalizing VIT creates a risk that some victims
would receive more sympathy than others. It asks whether victims’ ability to articu-
late their feelings should have bearing on the defendant’s sentence (Booth v. Mary-
land 1987, 505). My observations suggest that the institutionalization of VIT has
indeed meant that victims receive more or less sympathy. I would argue that this
has little to do with how worthy the victim may have actually been—or more to
the point—how much the defendant deserves death but more to do with the suc-
cess of the mourning ritual. Reframed through the lens of performance, we might
ask: What makes for a successful social performance of mourning in contemporary
society? Simon (2007) suggests that crime victims have been imagined as the ideal-
ized subjects of the law in contemporary American criminal justice. When creating
judicial or legislative benefits for survivors of crime, victims are imagined to be
white, suburban homeowners. I would argue that victims’ supporters in capital
courtrooms also labor under that imaginary. Grieving the loss of a loved one takes
all kinds of forms: from celebration to seclusion to public parading (Rosenblatt,
Walsh, and Jackson 1976; Hockney 2001). The victims I observed as most success-
ful in compelling the emotions of others, however, conform to a middle-class West-
ern norm of public mourning. They display minimum anger, they cry in a
controlled manner, and they display respect for the proceedings. Further study
would need to look at how victims are received who do not fit this mold. How
might an overly different form of mourning be received? How do race and class
position effect the success of social performance of mourning?
Further, my observations suggest that the institutionalization of VIT pits defense
against victim supporters. There was little outright conflict, but there was no denying
the presence of a kind of revulsion, best demonstrated by the victim’s wife I encoun-
tered in the bathroom. Of what use is this anger, we must ask. As others have argued,
emotion is inevitable in the context of capital sentencing and should be dealt with
head-on rather than pretending it does not exist. The call for an “emotionally
intelligent” justice is at the core of a call for a re-envisioned criminal justice system
(Sherman 2003). In noncapital cases, emphasizing victim and defense supporters’
“shared suffering, common sources of pain, and systematic causes of victimization”
allows participants to avoid the struggle to decide who is more oppressed in the crim-
inal justice system, or who deserves more or better rights (Barker 2007). These shared
emotions could also be accentuated in the capital context. Families of victims and
defendants in capital cases have both experienced tremendous loss. How would an
emphasis on shared suffering change the death penalty system? Might jurors be less
likely to sentence a person to death if this antinomy did not exist? Would the death
penalty survive a victim-free sentencing phase?
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More than half a century ago, Arendt (1963) famously argued that the very
public inclusion of victims in the Eichmann trial degraded the legal process. As this
article has sought to demonstrate, the insertion of victim impact testimony into
death penalty trials is similarly problematic in the contemporary American context.
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